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Irony, contradiction, discontinuity, antagonism, ambiguity, paradox,
antinomy, aporia, contingency, indeterminacy, ambivalence—in a list that
continues. For decades, these have been the bywords of critical thought,
whether within legal studies, left historiography, or humanistic inquiry at
large. A constellation of such terms has defined what it means to do
“theory,” for that philosophical tradition’s structuralist-Marxist,
poststructuralist-deconstructive, and other contemporary proponents. On
the one hand, those grammars capture the broad intellectual ethos or spirit
that has animated critical and revisionist scholarship since theory’s heyday
and institutionalization beginning in the 1970s. But on the other, they have
also acted as the central apparatus of critique: it has been doctrinal that
unmasking properties like contradiction, paradox, discontinuity, and
antagonism will work simultaneously to disclose and to critique structures
of power and domination. Vested with intensely political labor, that
conceptual matrix has not only summed up the essence of a radical, left, or
progressive politics but also been understood to distinguish such a political
project from a (neo)liberal-legalistic-rationalist one.
Central to basically all schools and applications of theory has accordingly
been a cohesive intellectual fabric woven by conviction in the analytic yield
and superiority of insights derived from encounters with paradox,
contradiction, and a web of analytic counterparts. Critics have sometimes
sparred over the alleged divergences separating certain of those terms from
others, for instance asking whether emphasis on “discontinuity” waters
down more muscular critique instead fueled by “antagonism.”1 While such
disputes are at base fights over contending schools of theory, this essay is
foremost interested in charting the terrain that connects this conceptual
Associate Professor of English and Associate Member of the Law Faculty, Cornell University.
1. See, e.g., Christopher Tomlins, What Is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm After Critique?
Revisiting Gordon’s “Critical Legal Histories,” 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 155 (2012).
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matrix and its diverse tenets—including uniting its many academic
practitioners. As I will argue, an amalgam of qualities including not only
contradiction and paradox but also friction, fragmentation, indeterminacy,
discontinuity, dissensus, and more—qualities I will together refer to as
the “paradox matrix”—are in fact mere variations on a single, uniform set
of methodological assumptions, methods, conclusions, and themes. Faith in
the critical, resistant, and transformative edge of those qualities has
therefore represented a site of unrecognized intellectual consensus—or the
location where Marxist ideology critique joins forces with Derrida and
Foucault. Indeed, precisely when challenging the potency of certain such
terms versus others do scholars end up reinforcing that overarching
conceptual fabric, diverting attention from the methodological homogeneity
that has come to characterize theory as an intellectual formation. What has
largely gone unquestioned is therefore not so much critique but its central
equipment, along with the premise that certain intellectual tools will prove
inherently critical and resistant. This essay’s first goal is to take stock of
that agreement, focusing in particular on the role of theory within critical
legal history.
Its second goal is to inquire into the sources of this consensus—a
consensus particularly striking given the rancor that can seem to roil some
circles of theory. There are multiple reasons that the paradox matrix has
both endured and proven all-encompassing. On one level, philosophical
investment in qualities like paradox and contradiction derives from the vast
and variegated intellectual labor those properties are enlisted to carry out,
causing them to govern all stages and components of the reasoning process.
While the machinery of critique, those properties have further been touted
as the locus of a radicalized agency, activism, change, justice, ethics, and
more. But on another level, such faith descends from its own multistranded
genealogy, one thread of which lies with discourses of the modern. With
startling regularity, modernity has been both diagnosed as a condition of
mounting paradox and critiqued according to such a logic. As I will argue,
the project of theory was both fashioned and ingrained vis-à-vis a recurring
set of debates about modernity and its chameleon faces—faces similarly
distilled in terms of those all-enveloping qualities. Since all theorists in
essence inherit the same narrative of modernity and its decisive features, it
is not surprising that this explanatory edifice would tower still today—just
as critique itself is often deemed a quintessentially “modern” phenomenon.
Above all, this essay endeavors to raise questions about this intellectual
fabric and its epistemology. To begin, we will observe certain limits to
haunt prevailing tales of modernity, wherein consciousness of paradox and
contradiction is imagined to materialize a sort of dividing line exiling a not-
yet-modern (or insufficiently paradoxical) worldview from modernity as a
threshold. Serving inextricably to critique and to consolidate modernity as
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a category, the paradox matrix has thereby policed its enclaves,
rationalizing modernity’s exclusions and foreclosures. Theory has
internalized this logic, including its colonialist underpinnings. Second,
accompanying that shared framework have been default assumptions
concerning not only critique but also the anatomy of power, ideology, and
oppression. The architecture of critique has been erected on a highly
specific (and, I will suggest, predictable) explanation of power: or the
conceit that power is actualized as well as solidified by suppressing and
mastering sites of paradox and contradiction. However, what if
authoritarianism today looks very different from the mid-century political
environment that hardwired these methodological warrants into theory?
Third, this essay examines why such reasoning tends to culminate with a
neo-formalist privileging of style—or a pluralist “poetics” of history-
writing as well as justice. Such an outcome is surely ironic, given the Realist
complaints about legal formalism built upon by Critical Legal Studies
(“CLS”) and other humanistic critiques of law (structuralist and
poststructuralist alike). Yet nearly across the board, not only have all
manifestations of power been thus diagnosed, assessed, and dismantled
according to a stock and widely generalizable explanatory grid; in addition,
the affirmative, transformative horizons of a radicalized politics have been
deciphered by way of redemptive ideas about paradox, indeterminacy,
ambivalence, and other related qualities. This investment in a distinct style
and aesthetics of activism grounded in the perpetual staging of
contradiction, irony, parody, and so on has not been an exclusive artifact of
fields like literary studies. Such a method has also infused more materialist
and structuralist variants of critique, including revisionist legal history.
There are, no doubt, salient divergences separating terms like “irony” or
“indeterminacy” from “antagonism” and “contradiction,” notwithstanding
their frequently interchangeable functions. But while parsing those
distinctions, this essay mainly strives to map key conjunctures. The sheer
number of issues and debates that have been routed through a pre-set
itinerary of critique has come to empty theory of crucial analytic and critical
precision. So notwithstanding the abiding imperative to question
normativity, orthodoxy, and other guises of the status quo, the paradox
matrix has functioned as its own settled doctrine—and doctrine capable of
being grafted onto virtually any issue on the table. Hence, it is perhaps less
that critique per se has run out of steam, as Bruno Latour famously
cautioned, than that our central levers of critique have become not only rote
but also ill-equipped to tackle the most urgent legal and political challenges
of the present.2
2. Bruno Latour, Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern, 30
CRITICAL INQUIRY 225 (2004).
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I. THE PARADOX-CONTRADICTION MATRIX
It is axiomatic within critical legal scholarship that the institutions of law
demand unrelenting suspicion. Imagined as an invariable helpmate to
power, law and especially its liberal or legalistic expressions have been oft-
indicted—and sometimes in terms that can seem to scapegoat a ready if not
caricatured target.3 Integral to that chronic skepticism has been a uniform
methodological-interpretive apparatus, which has been brought to bear
upon myriad legal constructs, debates, and doctrinal areas. The diverse
constructs of property, contract, rights, proceduralism, constitutionalism,
and more have therefore all been analyzed by way of a constant and
controlling critical repertoire: a repertoire orchestrated by paradox and its
matrix of accompanying terms.
While what follows examines the evolution of this critical mode, we can
look to one contemporary statement of such reasoning for those standard
moves and assumptions. In textbook fashion, the entry for Property in the
2007 Keywords for American Cultural Studies exhibits multiple hallmarks
of this methodological privileging of paradox and contradiction. The entry’s
author, Grace Kyungwon Hong, explains of property:
The keyword “property” thus indexes a contradiction between the
ostensible universal endowment of the rights to property for all U.S.
citizens and the uneven actualization of that right through forms of
racial and gender dispossession. U.S. culture is a crucial site where this
contradiction is managed, troubled, and destabilized. Diverse cultural
artifacts and practices disavow this contradiction, even as they serve
as sites where the histories of the propertyless can be articulated.4
Less a definition than a critique, Hong’s entry begins by pinpointing an
apparent “contradiction” intrinsic to property, which legal protection of that
institution is charged with masking and thereby perpetuating. In Hong’s
thinking, the injustice of not only property but also rights concerns how
their legalization works to “manage” and “disavow” contradiction.
Exposing those tensions is furthermore held out as a surefire mechanism of
critique, allowing Hong to arraign property as disbursed “unevenly” and
predicated on “forms of dispossession” that “belie the ostensible
universality of propertied citizenship.”5
Over the entry’s course, Hong walks through a series of related
contradictions understood to plague the law of property, reasoning support
for which is found in not only Karl Marx but also texts like Cheryl I.
3. For a paradigmatic example of this, see JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990).
4. Grace Kyungwon Hong, Property, in KEYWORDS FOR AMERICAN CULTURAL STUDIES 181 (Bruce
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Harris’s Whiteness as Property.6 The disclosure of those contradictions is
also imagined to carry innately radical-critical effects: to naturally “trouble”
and “destabilize” that institution. But we can here begin to observe the
ambidextrous labor performed by a quality like contradiction. While a
constitutive feature of property culpable for that institution’s structural
oppressions, contradiction also emerges as a kind of answer to those crimes.
As such, it is not accidental that Hong appeals to the contradictions latent
within “cultural artifacts”—although to suggest how contradiction can
become productive.
While traditions of critiquing capitalism represent one variant of such
reasoning, Hong’s basic assumptions have extended well beyond the orbit
of Marxist analysis. That said, it is also within Marxist thought that
insistence specifically on contradiction has been fundamental, including
within historiography. Thus begins Frederic Jameson’s 1981 The Political
Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act: “Always historicize!”
Indeed, that “slogan” is one Jameson overtly embraces as his influential
book’s chief “moral.”7 Whereas Jameson (like Hong) reads culture as
composed of “socially symbolic texts,” his statement of method (and
corresponding efforts to segregate Marxist critique from poststructuralist
theory)—”the notion of contradiction is central to any Marxist cultural
analysis”—could easily be mistaken as a platform of critical legal study.8
As we will see, critical legal scholars have consistently submitted the
operations of law and conventional law scholarship to an analogous
critique: that law masks, buries, resolves, and contains social antagonism
(i.e. class conflict) and its latent contradictions. Much like Jameson, critical
legal thought has similarly sought to show law to be an “ideological act[] in
[its] own right,” possessing an unconscious “whereby real social
contradictions, insurmountable in their own terms, find a purely formal
resolution in the aesthetic realm.”9
Still additional aspects of Jameson’s thought render it an instructive
starting point in an essay foremost addressing scholarship on law. Although
Jameson stresses the paramountcy of contradiction in structurally
materialist analysis, he nevertheless draws liberally from a host of adjacent
terminologies and values. As he explains of literary criticism, “[i]t follows,
then, that the interpretive mission of a properly structural causality will on
the contrary find its privileged content in the rifts and discontinuities within
6. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993). See also LISA LOWE,
IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 24-25 (1996).
7. Recent work on method within literary and cultural theory has often looked to Jameson as a kind of
launching pad. For example, see Sharon Marcus and Stephen Best, Surface Reading: An Introduction,
108 REPRESENTATIONS 1 (2009).
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the work.”10 The Antinomies of Realism exhibits a similar rhetorical
profligacy, evident in Jameson’s argument that realism “has to be grasped
as a paradox and an anomaly, and the thinking of it as a contradiction or an
aporia.”11 What seemingly matters to Jameson, then, is less the specificity
of one particular term of art than the ends to which those different levers are
enlisted. And in the process, they are all held out as “symptoms” that reveal
apparent sites of unity and continuity to be a “mirage.”12 Underpinning
Jameson’s brand of Marxist critique is accordingly the premise that
ideology both produces and is secured by the mystification and denial of
contradiction, and his investment in that matrix of qualities is a direct
corollary to that account of ideology.
In large part, contradiction was also the mandate that underwrote critical
theory’s debut within the legal academy, acting as the core apparatus
deployed to reveal the ideological sleights of hand confounding legal
practice, doctrine, education and more. Duncan Kennedy’s and other early
Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) scholarship is here a case in point. As
Kennedy’s 1976 Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication avers,
his structuralist-historicist-phenomenological approach to law is, more than
anything, “the method of contradictions.”13 Entailing significantly more
than a realist or reformist pursuit of mere “contextualism,” Kennedy
defends the need to tangle with the contradictions lying below the surface
of even the “fundamental conflicts” within legal principles.14 Further
recalling Jameson, Kennedy, too, dismisses conventional legal reasoning
and categories alike as one extensive “mechanism for denying
contradiction.” Rather than confined to a single case study, that thesis is
similarly the denouement of Kennedy’s The Structure of Blackstone’s
Commentaries. Therein, Kennedy again demonstrates the entire history of
legal reasoning to be a protracted process of “mediating” or hiding
contradiction, leading Kennedy to sanction mainstream legal scholarship as
representing a fundamentally “apologetic enterprise.”15
While contradiction was a if not the main driver within early CLS
scholarship, that movement quickly evolved to incorporate a much wider
arsenal of critical terms into its roster. Whether due to the influence of
deconstruction or CLS’s self-identification as a charismatic movement, it
absorbed much of the methodological eclecticism that today characterizes
theory across the humanities. Although by many accounts CLS became
marginalized within the legal academy, its many offshoots have maintained
not only its broad political but also its underlying methodological
10. Id. at 56.
11. FREDERIC JAMESON, THE ANTINOMIES OF REALISM 11 (2013).
12. Id. at 56.
13. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
14. Id. at 1766.
15. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979).
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commitments—and especially its investment in paradox and contradiction.
Even when actively dissenting from certain pillars of CLS, theorists of law
have thus remained faithful to the paradox matrix and its analytic protocols.
For example, many inaugural statements of critical race theory broke
ranks with CLS over discrete positions like the critique of rights, all the
while reproducing that basic critical framework. Indeed, many of those
rejoinders actively brought the “method of contradiction” back to bear upon
CLS, charging that movement with blindness to the contradictions
underlying its main principles. Mari Matsuda’s 1987 Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations thus condemns CLS’s categorical
rejection of rights as a sign of that movement’s elitism, abstraction, and
historical amnesia.16 Angela P. Harris’s contemporaneous work on Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Theory instead calls out the contradictions
haunting feminist thought along almost identical lines,17 in a method
similarly choreographed by the unmasking of paradox and contradiction.
As Harris argues, MacKinnon’s thought displays “the very existence of
feminism [to be] something of a paradox,” and even Patricia Williams’s
scholarship becomes a lesson in “self-contradiction” and “paradox.”18
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s influential thought can illustrate how such a
method has relatedly shaped the interpretation of isolated episodes within
history. Like Harris, Crenshaw’s landmark 1989 Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex partly blames feminism’s exclusionary
account of womanhood on indifference to contradiction. Hence, Crenshaw
argues that the feminist movement became exclusionary precisely because
feminists were too quick to “rationalize the contradiction[s]” that arose
through their pretense to speak inclusively.19 While predictably defining
power (here, feminism’s) in terms of the contradictions it camouflages,
however, Crenshaw simultaneously champions the revolutionary potential
inherent to paradox. One central passage of Demarginalizing is a case in
point. Gesturing historically, Crenshaw deciphers Sojourner Truth’s life
and especially her 1851 speech, “Ain’t I A Woman?” as a vindication of the
reasoning examined in this essay. As Crenshaw maintains of Truth, she
“us[ed] her own life to reveal the contradiction” between myth and reality,
enacting a “personal challenge to the coherence of the cult of true
womanhood.”20
As suggested, such conviction in the critical potency of paradox and its
16. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
17. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
18. Id. at 592, 608-09.
19. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
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conceptual matrix has been central to revisionist historiography—within the
legal academy and beyond. We can begin with Michel Foucault and his
1977 Nietzsche, Genealogy, History for a classic statement of the role of
such thinking within genealogy. As Foucault inveighs, the revisionist
historian’s task is to “fragment[] what was thought unified,” “introduce[e]
discontinuity into our very being,” demonstrate history to be “an unstable
assemblage of faults, fissures, and heterogenous layers,” and lay bare its
“systems of subjection” and “hazardous play of dominations.”21 But even
more instructive than the rhetorical and methodological overlap connecting
Foucault with the other thinkers examined so far are the shared ideas about
the ontology of power and domination that they all endorse. As Talal Asad
explains of genealogy, it proceeds with the unstated assumption that
“hegemonic power necessarily suppresses difference in favor of unity [and]
abhors ambiguity.”22 Both Marxist critique and genealogy, in other words,
conceive of power/ideology according to a symmetrical formula. Almost
unanimously have theorists thus understood power to shore itself up
through—meaning that power can also be identified by—its deceptive
manufacture of unity, order, and cohesion. The theorist’s task relative to
that semblance of unity, in turn, comes to be distilled according to a
similarly recurring methodological framework. Whether by divulging
“discontinuity” and “fragmentation” (within Foucaultian historiography) or
“contradiction” and “antagonism” (for structural materialists), exposing
unity and coherence to be, in Jameson’s words, a “mirage” is the first step
both to critiquing and to unraveling those liaisons between power and
history.
Robert Gordon’s scholarship not only exemplifies the importance of
genealogy to critical histories of law but also widely promulgated a version
of this basic method, rendering it the backbone of legal history and “law
and society” scholarship alike. As Gordon submits in his seminal 1984
Critical Legal Histories, law and society need to be understood as
“inextricably mixed” in ways that make “[o]ur accustomed ways of thinking
about law and history [] as culturally and historically contingent as ‘society’
and ‘law’ themselves would likewise explain of critical history.”23 For
Gordon, such a project further requires an emphasis on “indeterminacy”—
although an indeterminacy involving more than mere structural causality.
Describing the thoroughgoing contingency of law, Gordon clarifies: “The
same body of law, in the same context, can always lead to contrary results
because law is indeterminate at its core, in its inception, not just in its
21. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in THE FOUCAULT READER 76, 82, 86 (Paul
Rabinow ed., 1984).
22. TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN CHRISTIANITY
AND ISLAM 17 (1993).
23. Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 107, 101 (1984).
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applications. The indeterminacy exists because legal rules derive from
structures of thought, the collective constructs of many minds, that are
fundamentally contradictory.”24 As for many others, Gordon underscores
another reason for methodological investment in the paradox matrix: law is
shaped by a type of “unconscious,” individual and collective.
II. MODERNITY AND ITS OTHERS
One set of explanations for this methodological and conceptual unanimity
lies with the diagnosis of modernity that critical theory emerges from and
ratifies. Within theory and beyond, modernity has unfailingly been defined
as a condition of mounting paradox and contradiction. Thus opens Marshall
Berman’s classic 1982 All That is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of
Modernity: “To be modern is to live a life of paradox and contradiction.”25
As Berman further explains: “[M]odernity can be said to unite all mankind.
But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all into a
maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and
contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish.”26 Though Berman foregrounds
the “experiential” aspects of modernity, it is hard to find authoritative
accounts of modernity that do not seize upon one grammar of paradox or
another, drawing on that conceptual matrix in order to denominate
modernity’s core dynamics—negative and positive together.
Berman adopts not only his book’s title but core insights into modernity
from Marx. In many ways, his title quoting Marx and Friedrich Engels’
1848 pamphlet is itself a statement of the omnipresent and constitutive
status of modern contradiction. As Chapter One of The Communist
Manifesto proclaims:
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that
is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober
senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.27
Far from peculiar to Marxist analysis, that rendition of modernity has
been echoed across the canon of theory—and beyond. Epistemic
disembedding, cultural disintegration, psycho-spiritual privation, and social
rupture have been widely hallowed as the distinguishing features of modern
existence. This tale of splintering and dissolution of the formerly unified is
similarly implicit to Max Weber’s rationalization thesis, which associates
24. Id. at 114.
25. MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY 13
(1988).
26. Id. at 15.
27. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, 1 MARX/ENGELS SELECTED WORKS 98, x (1969).
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modernization with intensified modes of bureaucratization, efficiency,
calculation, and control that entrap the individual within an “iron cage” or
“steel-hard casing.”28 Analogously does a text like Freud’s 1929
Civilization and Its Discontents endorse such an assessment regarding the
unprecedented constraints that modernity imposes on both individual and
society. In wrestling with the irony that “civilization” exacerbates anxiety
and neurosis by compelling a “renunciation of instinct,” Freud mulls the
contradiction that “what we call our civilization is largely responsible for
our misery.”29
At the same time as insistence on paradox and contradiction issues a
diagnosis, theorists’ main motive for singling out those qualities has been
that of critique. Without fail, the finding of contradiction is a prelude to
disclosing modernity’s dark sides and negative bequests, such as for Marx
the predicament of estranged labor. Similarly do Max Horkheimer and
Theodor Adorno in their 1947 Dialectic of Enlightenment wrestle with the
contradiction that “the gifts of fortune themselves become elements of
misfortune,” causing “enlightenment [to become] as totalitarian as any
system.”30 Even today, the identification of lurking contradiction remains a
primary technique for exposing modernity’s gifts to be oppressive.
Returning to critical race theory, substantial scholarship has therefore been
devoted to displaying ostensible ideals like progress and civilization to
paradoxically depend on structural practices of racialized dispossession.
Hence, Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double
Consciousness (1993) defines “proximity to racial terror as the[] ‘inaugural
experience’” of the modern.31 Saidiya Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection:
Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America likewise
demonstrates the institution of slavery not only to have created economic
prosperity but also to have lent intelligibility to ideals like self-
determination and freedom. As Hartman argues, “The slave is the object or
the ground that makes possible the existence of the bourgeois subject and,
by negation or contradistinction, defines liberty, citizenship, and the
enclosures of the social body.”32 Effectively all of modernity’s
endowments—whether democracy, rights, the nation-state, historicity, or
Enlightenment reason—have been thus debunked via a method that seizes
upon paradox and contradiction as the first step in a larger odyssey of
critique.
28. MAX WEBER, WEBER: POLITICAL WRITINGS, at xvi (Peter Lassman ed., Ronald Speirs trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1994).
29. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 51-52, 38 (James Strachey ed., James
Strachey trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 2010) (1930).
30. MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 24, iv (Continuum
1947) (1944).
31. PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC: MODERNITY AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS 73 (1993).
32. SAIDIYA HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 62 (1997).
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As should be self-evident, there is no question that these and other
liabilities of modernity demand urgent, vigilant, and never-ending critique
and interrogation. Relatedly, there is little doubt that contradiction and
paradox have offered potent tools in such an undertaking. However, the
recurring equation between modernity and paradox has fulfilled
significantly more complicated intellectual labor than simply to diagnose or
to dismantle. Often in the same breath, the paradox matrix has channeled
the affirmative, generative, fertile opportunities made available by
modernity and its ambivalent fruits. Much as Berman suggests, modernity
has encoded more than a specific set of historical developments; it has also
been valorized as the dawn of a quintessentially modernist spirit, subject,
and sensibility. Those creative energies of the modern have also been
acclaimed through a grammar of contradiction and paradox—here, too, for
thinkers ranging far beyond leftist or theoretical circles. With the collapse
of conventional bastions of authority (church, state, feudalism), modern life
became irrevocably fractured, and comprehensively so. Just as traditional
vestiges of power lost their foundations, so did truth and knowledge become
newly unstable—riddled with doubt and uncertainty. For some, a logic of
partition best explains this trajectory that not only fragmented truth but also
sequestered domains of expertise from one another, often placing them into
competition. Whether bifurcating morality from politics (Reinhart
Koselleck), “knowing” from belief (Jurgen Habermas), or science from
politics (Latour), modern regimes of truth became not simply dualistic in a
Cartesian sense but progressively fissured, compartmentalized, and
embattled.33 As Latour explains, these partitions both intensified and
disseminated conditions of paradox, in part given the unprecedented
burdens of self-justification that those emergent orders of disciplinary
knowledge encountered.34
While brewing a mood of chronic crisis, this epistemic unmooring also
forged modern skepticism—and in turn the (self-)critical subject. Along
with accounts of the fractures of modern knowing arose a vision of the
modern subject as comparatively riven by pervasive indeterminacy, irony,
and contradiction. It goes without say that philosophy’s many approaches
to delineating those manifold paradoxes endemic to modern selfhood are
too many to recount. Yet whether implicit to Durkheim’s influential notion
of homo duplex or psychoanalytic insistence on the repressions foundational
to the subject or theories of “double consciousness” indebted to W.E.B. Du
Bois, it has been doctrinal that the modern predicament is to be self-divided
in ways that find the individual—like modern expressions of truth—torn
33. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY: TWELVE LECTURES 19
(1990) (“separate[s] off . . . spheres of knowing . . . from the sphere of belief.”); REINHART
KOSELLECK, CRITIQUE AND CRISIS: ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE PATHOGENESIS OF MODERN SOCIETY,
at x (1988).
34. BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 30 (Catherine Porter trans., 1993).
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between rival and often irreconcilable imperatives. Like Latour, moral
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre thus understands modernity to “partition []
each life into a variety of segments,” producing a moral existence “after
virtue.”35 Similarly for Charles Taylor, the “moral world” of the moderns is
“full of gaps, erasures, and blurrings.”36
Such an image of the paradox-riddled subject has been counterpart not
only to rampant skepticism but also to modes of critique spearheaded by
conviction in thoroughgoing contradiction and paradox. Not surprisingly,
this temper of critique has at times been heralded as one of modernity’s
positive endowments, including by some of the theory canon’s greatest
sages of the untold dominations instated by modernity. For instance,
Foucault thus disarticulates the ambivalent legacies of modernity (a label
Foucault himself resisted) in his classic reformulation of Kant’s 1784 What
Is Enlightenment? While jettisoning the “doctrinal elements” of Kantian
critique, Foucault nonetheless pledges fidelity to Kant’s “attitude.” For
Foucault, modernity occasions a “permanent reactivation of an attitude”
involving “a permanent critique of our historical era.”37 Infinite and
ongoing, modern skepticism for Foucault furthermore involves a “limit-
attitude,” or project “of analyzing and reflecting on limits” and their
“possible transgression.”38 Central among those ambivalent limits,
moreover, is “the paradox of the relations of capacity and power”—offering
another famed equation of modernity and endemic paradox.39
However, precisely this exaltation of paradox-fueled critique has
simultaneously policed the borders of modernity, insulating that category
from its pre-modern, insufficiently critical others. Importantly, that
exclusionary cartography of the modern has been traced all the way down
to the building blocks of modern skepticism, including the distinctive
reading and interpretive habits associated with critique. As Michael Warner
explains, “critical reading” since Kant has dictated “a negative movement
of []disengagement or repudiation” that presumes “a clear opposition
between the text object and the reading subject—indeed, critical reading
could be thought of as an ideal for maximizing that polarity, defining the
reader’s freedom and agency as an expression of distance from a text that
must be objectified as a benchmark of distanciation.”40 In Warner’s account,
the imperative to modern critique relegates immediate, unabstracted, self-
present, unified ways of knowing to the status of the non-modern and
35. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY OF MORAL THEORY 204 (1981).
36. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 11 (1989).
37. MICHEL FOUCAULT,What Is Enlightenment?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 32, 42 (Paul Rabinow ed.,
1984).
38. Id. at 45.
39. Id. at 47.
40. MICHAEL WARNER, Uncritical Reading, in POLEMIC: CRITICAL OR UNCRITICAL 13, 24, 20 (Jane
Gallop ed., 2004).
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uncritical. But from another standpoint, this “polarity” or opposition
between experiential immersion and objective judgment will itself dis-
integrate knowing and perception—in essence, breeding modern paradox
and installing cognitive-epistemic dissonance at the heart of modern
knowing.
For others, it is in particular when viewed as a secular mandate that
critique disburses such disciplinary and exclusionary effects, disallowing
full modernity to certain lives, populations, and cultures. Akin to Warner,
Saba Mahmood argues that the onus to secularity both postulates
assumptions about and sanctions “improper reading practices.” For
Mahmood, too, critique must therefore be conceived as actualized through
distinctive habits of relating to symbols and signs—habits that, however,
stigmatize non-Euro-American textures of belief and belonging. Rather
than individualist versus collectivist per se, secularism in its Judeo-
Christian derivations is better explained as a “semiotic ideology in which
signifiers are arbitrarily linked to concepts,” or a representational economy
involving a fundamental disunity of meaning that is, once again, fated to
proliferate paradox.41 While for Webb Keane this premium on objectifying
distance is also profoundly anti-materialist, debates about secularism
illustrate why not merely the compulsion to critique but rather the
consciousness of paradox thus awakened can operate as a benchmark—and
one long enlisted to deny the capacity for modernity to certain lives.42
Over time, theorists have singled out a range of other faculties for
analogously policing the frontier separating modernity from its pre-modern
others. A historical awareness, or “historicity,” has similarly been blamed
for being exclusionary. As Asad suggests, “[t]he West defines itself, in
opposition to all non-Western cultures, by its modern historicity.”43 As a
gauge, historicity similarly hinges on suppositions about what a lapse or
failure of that quality looks like, entailing that “[a]ctions seeking to maintain
the ‘local’ status quo, or to follow local models of social life, do not qualify
as history-making.”44 One goal of Asad’s observations is to probe the blind
41. SABA MAHMOOD, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?, 35 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 836, 844, 841 (2009).
42. Both Mahmood and in particular Webb Keane trace such reasoning widely, locating its origins
within foundational discourses of modernity, within social scientific literature (for Keane, both Weber
and Durkheim’s notion of the “duplex character” of language), and within Continental theory (Keane
singles out Marx and Heidegger as both differently equating modernity with objectification). Moreover,
Keane in particular sees post-Saussurian linguistics as the summit of such profoundly dematerialized
theories of language (and of everything those theories censure). WEBB KEANE, CHRISTIAN MODERNS:
FREEDOM AND FETISH IN THE MISSION ENCOUNTER 21 (2007). See also TORIL MOI, REVOLUTION OF
THE ORDINARY: LITERARY STUDIES AFTER WITTGENSTEIN, AUSTIN, AND CAVELL (2017).
43. ASAD, supra note 22, at 18.
44. Id. at 19. As Hayden White similarly explains, “it is possible to view historical consciousness as a
specifically Western prejudice by which the presumed superiority of modern, industrial society can be
retroactively substantiated.” HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE 2 (1973).
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spots those warrants have introduced into anthropology, a field that has
historically constructed its objects of analysis as “culturally marginal” to
Europe and therefore in terms “often dependent on [a] contrastive sense of
the modern.”45 As Asad suggests, the notion of historicity has (like critique)
thereby acted as a badge not only of modernity but of that category’s inverse
and deficit. But while indicting anthropology for its colonialist pasts, even
more revealing is the methodology Asad draws upon to expose that covert
bias. Like so many, Asad’s method of critique is to call out and decry certain
contradictions informing that field and its enabling assumptions.
While benchmarks like critique and historicity have thus served to banish
the insufficiently modern from that category’s enclaves, arguably more than
any other threshold has consciousness of paradox worked to shore up the
putative modern-ancient divide. With great regularity has the paradox
matrix acted as the central horizon imagined to offset a modern
consciousness from the not-yet. Indeed, even when the category of
modernity is placed under pressure, much as for Asad, has a methodology
scaffolded by paradox functioned as an unstated yet compulsory baseline.
Here again, I could gesture far and wide to demonstrate the pervasiveness
of such reasoning. Beginning with Marxist thought, Georg Lukács’s
influential 1914-15 Theory of the Novel is foremost a literary-intellectual
history of the novel’s evolution. Yet Lukács’s study, not surprisingly by
now, rests upon an opposition between a modern versus ancient fabric of
knowing. As he avers, Greek culture was harmonious, homogenous,
rounded, and totalizable, allowing for a “passively visionary accept[ance]
of ready-made, ever-present meaning.” That experiential coherence is
mirrored in the epic form, within which “life and essence are [] identical
concepts.”46 It is vis-à-vis those background assumptions about “integrated
civilizations” (the title of Lukács’s first chapter) that Lukacs instead
theorizes the novel as, unlike the epic form, an internalization of the
“fissures and rents,” “fragmentary” or “antagonistic” reality, and larger
“transcendental homelessness” of modernity as a condition.47 While within
the novel those tensions become dynamic, Lukács nevertheless presents
them as a kind of borderline or barrier. As he elaborates, “The Greek knew
only answers but no questions, only solutions (even if enigmatic ones) but
no riddles, only forms but no chaos. He drew the creative circle of forms
this side of paradox, and everything which, in our time of paradox, is bound
to lead to triviality, led him to perfection.”48 In Lukács’s reasoning, paradox
condenses everything distinctive about the modern, even while it patrols
45. ASAD, supra note 22, at 23, 19.
46. GYÖRGY LUKÁCS, THE THEORY OF THE NOVEL: A HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON THE
FORMS OF GREAT EPIC LITERATURE 32, 30 (Anna Bostock trans., MIT Press 1971).
47. Id. at 60, 41, 62.
48. Id. at 31.
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modernity’s perimeter.
This impulse to cite paradox as the watermark of modernity, as suggested,
has been ubiquitous, connecting otherwise unrelated philosophical schools
and styles. In variations on Lukacs’s schism, paradox—or, rather, a dearth
of that quality—has consistently structured myths of modernity’s pre-
lapsarian foil and antithesis. Notwithstanding the colonialist logic haunting
such a polarity, it has acted as second nature. For instance, MacIntyre’s
After Virtue grounds its critique of modernity by surmising that within
“heroic” societies, “morality and social structure are in fact one and the
same,” causing pre-modern art forms (again, the epic) to “embody” that
givenness.49 Taylor’s 1989 Sources of the Self erects a parallel binary:
contra modernity, “earlier civilizations” espoused “frameworks” of belief
and judgment that were fundamentally “unquestioned.”50 For many, that
imagined divide has conducted monumental intellectual labor. Revisiting
Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents’s study of the neuroses of the
modern subject similarly hinges on a contrast between the ills of
“civilization” and the “happier” ways of “primitive conditions.”51 Relatedly
does Paul Ricoeur juxtapose the “hermeneutics of suspicion” whose three
“masters” were Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx with the “univocity of
meaning” characteristic of Greek philosophy and culture, especially
Aristotle’s law of identity.52 Analogous examples could continue on and on.
Within theories of modernity, we can accordingly observe the
complicated role played by paradox and its conceptual analogues. In one
sense, the power of such reasoning lies with how it collapses the dual
functions of, first, contradiction as a definitional feature of modernity into,
second, contradiction as the primary tool enabling that category’s critique.
Counterintuitively, a recurring set of features is thus invoked as both
modernity’s constitution and the primary weapon for exposing its rampant
violence. Yet in either case, paradox and its explanatory matrix ultimately
indexes as well as inaugurates what is heralded as an elevated, superior
awareness and way of knowing. But at what point does this conceptual
architecture end up reinforcing the very prejudices and exclusions that have
sanctioned modernity’s worst abuses? Does methodological insistence on
paradox, even when a vehicle of critique, reinscribe the exclusionary logic
that has long plagued modernity as a developmental horizon?
Even more striking, this same conceptual matrix and set of terms has been
widely taken to encode the unique opportunities for agency, ethics, and
resistance afforded by a modernist sensibility—a sensibility analogously
49. MACINTYRE, supra note 35, at 22-125.
50. TAYLOR, supra note 36, at 16.
51. FREUD, supra note 29, at 38.
52. PAUL RICŒUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 23 (Denis Savage trans.,
1970).
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comprised of all-devouring paradox. We can examine two revisionist
histories of empire to illustrate the inextricability critical and redemptive
thrusts of such methodological reliance. Even within anti-colonial thought,
the privileging of qualities like paradox and contradiction can marshal a
stagist or developmentalist logic and assumptions. For example, Dipesh
Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe (2000) deploys genealogy to bring
critiques of imperialism to bear on history as a discipline and construct,
indicting historiography’s apologetics for colonial exploitation. Within
Chakrabarty’s study, contradiction and its conceptual kin thus not only
diagnose modernity but also comment on the lacunae haunting mainstream
historical scholarship. Like others, Chakrabarty in particular denounces the
impulse to erase or submerge ambivalence as what implicates conventional
modes of history-writing within “the formation of political modernity in the
erstwhile European colonies” that “enabled European domination.”53 In
essence, history and empire are charged with symmetrical (if not identical)
errors: with manufacturing an illusion of unity that depends on the
suppression of sites of contradiction. As Chakrabarty explains,
historicism’s league with empire lies precisely with the ways it “takes its
object of investigation to be internally unified, and sees it as something
developing over time.”54 Conversely, it is faith in contradiction that endows
critical historiography with its progressivist and anti-colonial politics. As
Chakrabarty reflects on his own method: “The idea is to write into the
history of modernity the ambivalences, contradictions, the use of force, and
the tragedies and ironies that attend it.”55 He deciphers the book’s title in
similar terms: “To provincialize Europe in historical thought is to struggle
to hold in a state of permanent tension a dialogue between two contradictory
points of view.”56
Importantly, those “double binds” for Chakrabarty cannot be evaded, just
as critique for Foucault cannot shirk its enlightenment inheritance.57 But
further interesting, here, is how ambivalence and its counterparts emerge as
a kind of remedy or answer to that predicament. While promoting those
properties’ value as instruments of critique, Chakrabarty simultaneously
recommends the staging of contradiction as a self-immunizing strategy for
negotiating and potentially mitigating the inevitable complicities of history-
writing. Chakrabarty thus importunes: “I ask for a history that deliberately
makes visible, within the very structure of its narrative forms, its own
53. DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL
DIFFERENCE 7 (2000).
54. Id. at 23.
55. Id. at 43; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’
Pasts?, 37 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 21 (1992).
56. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 53, at 254.
57. Id. at 40, 5.
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repressive strategies and practices.”58 As such, irony, narrative, and other
literary-aesthetic qualities operate as more than diagnoses or levers of
critique. In addition, that critical arsenal comes to be imbued with its own
productive agency.
We can look to another revisionist history of colonial modernity to grasp
how such reasoning can culminate with something like an ethics. In terms
reminiscent of Chakrabarty’s, David Scott’s Conscripts of Modernity: The
Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (2004) promotes tragedy and irony as
responses to colonial-political modernity and its structural contradictions.
In his study, Scott re-reads C.L.R. James’s classic 1938 The Black Jacobins
and its portrait of Toussaint L’Ouverture to draw a sequence of conclusions
about modernity—conclusions we have already observed to be default
positions. Scott hails the Haitian Revolution as “one of the founding events
of the modern age,” given how it ushered in the fraught “cognitive-political
terrain of modernity” marked by incessant “social crisis, the collision of
embattled and irreconcilable social forces.”59 What modernity thus entails
for a historical actor like Toussaint is to be “obliged to act in a world in
which values are unstable and ambiguous” and to confront “a broken series
of paradoxes and reversals in which human action is ever open to
unaccountable contingencies—and luck.”60
Although familiar, Scott’s account of modernity further feeds into a
theory of political agency that takes paradox as its crux. For Scott, it is
crucial that Toussaint be understood as a “conscript” rather than “resisting
agent” of modernity. While tragic and compromised, however, his plight is
something Scott ultimately venerates. For one, it engenders an
unprecedented mode of modern intellectualism; Scott reads James’s
original text as fixated on “the emergence of a new kind of individual, the
modern intellectual” of which Toussaint is “paradigmatic.”61
Accompanying that intellectual comportment is also a heightened
awareness one might be inclined to attribute to Du Bois, for Scott similarly
involving “the doubleness of knowledge: how it can obscure even as it
reveals, how it can disable as much as it enables, how it can imprison at the
very moment that it emancipates.”62 Like many others, Scott valorizes that
“doubleness” as occasioning a distinctive spirit and style, evident in Scott’s
claim that James sought “to establish Toussaint as a figure of enlightened
sensibility and modern—indeed, modernist—political desire.”63 As
elsewhere, this appeal to duality and ambivalence is multifaceted: it most
58. Id. at 45.
59. DAVID SCOTT, CONSCRIPTS OF MODERNITY: THE TRAGEDY OF COLONIAL ENLIGHTENMENT 21
(2004) at 129, 133, 163.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 20, 163.
62. Id. at 207.
63. Id. at 98.
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immediately embeds a diagnosis of power (concerning the colonial genesis
of modernity) geared to conduct anti-colonial critique. Yet along the way,
Toussaint’s “conscripted” action comes to be lauded for multiple reasons,
above all as an enhanced, elevated, and even aestheticized mode of being
or mentalité.64 Scott is emphatic that such an ethos, while dialectical, does
not anticipate synthesis or overcoming, goals that Scott dismisses as
“reductive.”65 Instead, Scott labels his revisionist history a “poetics” aimed
at “constant renegotiation and readjustment.”66
This essay’s next section grapples with this allusion to a poetics, along
with everything that term can telegraph. But for now, it is hard to deny that
Chakrabarty and Scott deploy a conceptual framework that has long been
enlisted to rationalize empire: to exile colonized lives from the fully modern
in order to mask that category’s failed universalism and other enabling
contradictions. While Chakrabarty and Scott rely on the common gambit of
weaponizing contradiction to critique and to unmask, their reasoning
simultaneously affirms the prospect that a quintessentially modernist
attunement to paradox will inaugurate more nuanced, sophisticated, and
even ethical ways of knowing. It surely might seem ironic that anti-colonial
critique would mobilize an exclusionary structure of justification in the
hopes of indicting the very crimes that such a justificatory logic has
historically sanctioned. Yet even more, there is a way in which Scott plots
Toussaint’s tragic struggle to conform to exactly such a developmental
narrative of intensifying paradox—an exceptionalist tale we’ve seen to
necessitate the backdrop of allegedly not-yet-modern lives for its
intelligibility. It would go too far to suggest that these methodological
investments become actively self-sabotaging. Nevertheless, there are real
questions about whether those equations inadvertently solidify the very
warrants for structural oppression that Provincializing Europe, Conscripts
of Modernity, and so many other revisionist histories set out to challenge.
Neither Scott nor Chakrabarty so much as begins to question whether
attunement to paradox might not prove inherently critical, resistant, or
subversive. An unthinking article of faith is accordingly the notion that
paradox and its analogues will not only undermine power but also chart the
pathway to justice and ethics.
III. AESTHETICS, FORMALISM, AND STYLE
This all raises the question of why these equations have proven so
resilient and alluring. What has allowed such a conceptual grid to be grafted
onto so many disparate issues and debates? Within critical work on law,
64. Id. at 106.
65. Instead, Scott evokes Horkheimer and Adorno’s thought as a metric for “holding the contradictions
of modernity in a more productive nonreductive tension.” Id. at 189.
66. Id. at 21.
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what about such reasoning has enabled virtually any legal institution,
construct, or practice to be digested according to a recurring formula that
excavates contradiction, weaponizes it to effectuate critique, and then
assembles a mix of dialecticism-indeterminacy-paradox into a redemptive
philosophy of agency--if not a full-blown ethics? Clearly, this versatility
has itself proven gratifying. But what elements of this thinking that we’ve
now observed widely have not only enabled those transfers but also worked
to blind its practitioners to its rote, programmatic effects and uses?
I have already proposed one framework for addressing these quandaries,
one involving the overwhelming consensus that has characterized debates
about modernity and its many guises. The fact that the apparatus of critique
was fashioned with reference to a remarkably consistent account of
modernity offers one explanation for why so many theorists have invested
exorbitant faith in contradiction and paradox. What follows considers still
additional factors that have ingrained a “method of paradox and
contradiction” as a kind of academic common sense, although with the hope
of illustrating additional of such reasoning’s deficiencies and errors.
The historical climate that witnessed the efflorescence and eventual
institutionalization of theory contains other explanations for such
reasoning’s attractions. This 1970s milieu was, of course, that of the Cold
War, and it naturally meant that the theorizations of political power crafted
during that era foremost sought to anatomize totalitarianism, including its
relationship to liberal democracy. Naturally, that historical backdrop has
shaped debates about modernity and its limits—and, in fact, continues to
dictate dominant approaches to theorizing modernity and its paradoxical
logic. In particular, many (if not most) influential formulations of modernity
that cropped up during that era are subtended by assumptions about power
that, at base, reflect on mid-century authoritarianism and its distinguishing
features. What this further means is that our regnant views about modernity
and its bequests can seem to marshal a not-so-subtle conflation of pre-
modern cultures and the centralized, monopolistic totalitarian state.
Whatever epistemological unity, harmony, totality and coherence is
projected onto the ancient thus must be simultaneously understood as a relic
of historically dated fears about totalitarianism and absolutist expressions
of power.
The Russian Formalist Mikhail Bakhtin’s thought deals conspicuously in
these sorts of elisions. Following translation into English beginning in the
1970s, Bakhtin’s literary criticism experienced vogue within not only
Marxist but also many poststructuralist and deconstructive circles.
Disseminating a vocabulary of polyglossia, dialogism, hybridity, the
carnivalesque, parody, spontaneity, the polyglot, and indeterminacy,
Bakhtin’s thinking injects those terms with a politically emancipatory and
democratically anti-totalitarian flavor. But at once, with Bakhtin’s corpus
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those vocabularies issue commentaries on modernity and its central logic.
Much as for Lukács, a presumed rift dividing ancient from modern cultures
is foundational to Bakhtin’s theory of the novel, which he elaborates in The
Dialogic Imagination. As Bakhtin ruminates in familiar terms, the “epic
world knows only a single and unified world view, obligatory and
indubitably true,” just as Greek “creative consciousness was realized in
closed, pure languages.67 In contrast, Bakhtin characterizes the novel as a
struggle against those centralizing drives, a struggle realized through an
almost modernist spirit of subversive play. As he comments of that form’s
influence on other literary genres:
They become more free and flexible, their language renews itself by
incorporating extraliterary heteroglossia and the ‘novelistic’ layers of
literary language, they become dialogized, permeated with laughter,
irony, humor, elements of self-parody and finally — this is the most
important thing—the novel inserts into these other genres an
indeterminacy, a certain semantic openendedness, a living contact with
unfinished, still-evolving contemporary reality (the openended
present).68
Like others, these near-interchangeable grammars perform multiple
functions within Bakhtin’s reasoning. It is precisely a deficit or lapse of
qualities like indeterminacy that warrants Bakhtin’s critiques of both
closed, static cultures and authoritarian political forms, and it is that dearth
of paradox that betrays both to be comparatively repressive. In this vein
does Bakhtin contrast novelistic discourse with the “absolutism of a single
and unitary language” and the “centralizing” tendencies of other literary
modes.69 With those oppositions, Bakhtin can celebrate the heteroglossic
elements of the novel as living, “free,” “flexible,” and evolving. Moreover,
this “spirit of process and inconclusiveness” renders the novel, like
modernity, innately “critical and self-critical.” 70
While Bakhtin’s thought has lost the currency it once possessed, many of
his core assumptions remain alive and well, if anything experiencing new
life within contemporary political theory. Indeed, reasoning like Bakhtin’s
arguably reaches its summit with a thinker like Jacques Rancière, whose
anti-instrumentalist vision of politics actively enlists art and aesthetic
criticism to model radical democracy. Rancière delineates the intimacy
between aesthetics and politics: “If there exists a connection between art
and politics, it should be cast in terms of dissensus, the very kernel of the
aesthetic regime: artworks can produce effects of dissensus precisely
67. M. M. BAKHTIN, Epic and Novel, in THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 3, 35, 12 (Michael
Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981).
68. Id. at 7.
69. M. M. BAKHTIN, Discourse in the Novel, in THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 259, 366
(Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981).
70. BAKHTIN, supra note 67, at 7, 10.
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because they neither give lessons nor have any destination.”71 What
Bakhtin, Rancière, and countless others thus promote as an antidote to
power and oppression (whether totalitarian, colonial, or otherwise) is an
explicitly aestheticized politics—or, rather, what we might term a
conception of politics as modernist style. Far from confined to Bakhtin’s
work, this faith in qualities such as irony, parody, and aesthetic
indeterminacy is widely representative: of not only literary criticism but
also of accounts of radical constitutionalism, revisionist historicism,
progressive critiques of law, and more. As we noted in Scott, those
synonyms for paradox have been recruited in order to describe why a
radicalized history, change, agency, and activism will be fully “poetic” in
expression and style.
In a way, this conceit that a “poetics” or distinct “style” of thought can
guarantee a leftist or progressive politics met with its greatest popularity
during the decades that saw theory come of age. But the imprint of that
romance of an aestheticized politics remains comprehensive—still alive and
well within critical legal history and much humanistic inquiry today. A
broad swath of theory has been united by such preoccupation with style,
ranging across disciplinary boundaries, debates, theoretical schools, and
historical fields. Even while the impetus for such thinking can vary, it has
been sufficiently contagious as to unite thinkers otherwise proceeding from
markedly different intellectual-political allegiances and commitments.
To look briefly to three examples, Richard Rorty’s 1989 Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity offers one such tribute to an “intellectual history
viewed as the history of metaphor” that culminates with a poetics.72 For
Rorty, moreover, that conspicuous aestheticization of political-historical
thought adds up to what Rorty embraces as a “pluralism.” Akin to how
Ricoeur aligns Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx by dubbing them the three
“masters of suspicion,” for Rorty those thinkers’ affinity lies with their
common investment in dialectical-ironic thinking, or “the attempt to play
off vocabularies against one another.”73 As Rorty connects Freud’s uses of
metaphor with those of Freud’s literary-philosophical contemporaries:
“They feed each other lines. Their metaphors rejoice in one another’s
company.”74 In one sense, Rorty, like others, applauds qualities like irony
and “contingency” for illuminating the irrationalist dimensions of politics,
even while Rorty himself retains the language of “liberalism.”75 As Rorty
inveighs, “[w]e need a redescription of liberalism as the hope that culture
as a whole can be ‘poeticized’ rather than as the Enlightenment hope that it
71. JACQUES RANCIÈRE, DISSENSUS: ON POLITICS AND AESTHETICS 140 (Steven Corocoran trans.,
Bloomsbury 2010).
72. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 140 (1989).
73. Id. at 78.
74. Id. at 39.
75. Id. at 41.
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can be ‘rationalized’ or ‘scientized.’”76
Just as telling are Rorty’s hopes for the collectivizing energies of an
ironized-poeticized vision of both politics and history. Much as a shared
reliance on metaphor is imagined to cohere his canon of philosophers, it
informs Rorty’s dream of public belonging and community. Rorty
rhapsodizes “the “radical diversity of private purposes, of the radically
poetic character of individual lives, and of the merely poetic foundations of
the ‘we-consciousness’ which lies behind our social institutions.” And
while advocating an “increasing willingness to live with plurality and to
stop asking for universal validity,”77 Rorty’s reasoning illustrates how such
a collapse of the political into the aesthetic can work seamlessly to warrant
a methodological-ideological-normative pluralism.
Not coincidentally, Rorty’s self-professed ironism is burnished by what
he champions as “the presiding intellectual discipline”: literary criticism.78
This self-conscious donning of an analytic mode adapted from literary
studies is indicative of other frequent goals suggested by a “poetics.” For
many, the label “poetics” has above all signaled a formalism derived from
structuralist approaches to the study of literature. And although Rorty
trumpets the synergistic play of poetic inquiry, those formalist leanings
have frequently been understood to necessitate a strategic bracketing: to
require the sidelining of important inquiries and considerations.
A formalist poetics aimed at charting recurring structures of thought has,
not surprisingly, claimed separate influence within critical historicism—
much as we observed of Scott. Indeed, Scott directly engages Hayden
White’s influential 1973 Metahistory, with its “formalist approach to the
study of historical thinking.”79 White’s formalism aims at not only inquiry
into the narrative-ideological significance of certain now familiar
rhetorical-figural “tropes” (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony)
and thinkers (Nietzsche, Marx, Hegel, Croce) but also an overtly “linguistic
paradigm.”80 Notwithstanding the idiosyncrasies of White’s thought, he
relies on a common basis for distinguishing poetics from other brands of
inquiry: namely, he specifies the questions that such analysis omits or leaves
off the table. As White stipulates in a proviso, “I will not try to decide
whether a given historian’s work is a better, or more correct, account of a
specific set of events or segment of the historical process []; I will seek to
identify the structural components of those accounts.”81 Just as White
suggests, the stakes of a poetics frequently lie exactly with an intentional
eschewal of judgments regarding truth status, content, normative
76. Id. at 53.
77. Id. at 67.
78. Id. at 82.
79. WHITE, supra note 44, at 4.
80. Id. at 37.
81. Id. at 3-4.
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significance, or other such measures—offering another angle on the
“pluralism” espoused by Rorty. Put differently, however, a formalist
method can thus require the deliberate embargo of matters with which one
might expect a critical or progressive history instead to tarry.
For many, one virtue of a structuralist-formalist poetics of history,
culture, politics, and more involves its capacity to be extrapolated far and
wide: to be transposed onto an unending range of context-specific yet
formally mirroring scenarios (or for White, modes of emplotment).
However, this very transposability raises questions about whether such
analysis not only permits but actively thrives upon certain slippages: or
whether it will outright encourage analogical transfers between disparate
domains. As we saw for Scott, a poetics can facilitate broad generalizations,
allowing him to deduce from Toussaint’s particularized struggles global
conclusions about theory as an enterprise. I’d like to suggest that such traffic
also renders the diverse paradoxes of tragedy, modernity, theory, history,
and Toussaint’s life interchangeable—or, as Scott puts it, one and the same
“irrepressibly illusive” phenomenon digestible according to a single and
recurring conceptual scheme. And while intellectually exhilarating, those
synchronicities must also be traced to the genesis of such a poetics in a
“linguistic paradigm.” That linguistic derivation of the paradox matrix,
moreover, lays bare still additional casualties of such thought, beyond those
identified by thinkers like Mahmood and Keane. Just as Metahistory’s
typologies require a moratorium on the normative and factual, privileging
the symbolic-linguistic can contribute to an autonomization of those
registers—or theory’s divorce from real-world, material referents. While
allowing those metaphorical and other codes (as for Rorty) to take on a life
of their own, that infinite play of language becomes noticeably unmoored,
detached from the very contextualism it purports to navigate.
Whether culminating with a heady pluralism or a formalist bracketing of
normative criteria, neither Marxist nor critical legal thought has been
immune to the appeal of poetics. Berman’s All That Is Solid Melts Into Air
again exemplifies that attraction. Amid Berman’s classic tale of waning
faith in the synthesis promised by the dialectic post-’68, he simultaneously
promotes an alternate “dialectics of modernization and modernism” that is
just as much indebted to Nietzsche’s account of history as to Marx. Also
like Rorty, Berman magnifies the commonalities between those thinkers,
emphasizing how their shared style and voice “resonates at once with self-
discovery and self-mockery, with self-delight and self-doubt.”82 Berman
similarly exalts the stylistic-aesthetic qualities of that unifying style, with
its “rhythms” and “range” that become “ironic and contradictory,
polyphonic and dialectical.”83 Not coincidentally, it is Berman’s story of
82. BERMAN, supra note 25, at 23.
83. Id.
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warring modernities that allows him to arrive at a redemptive rewriting of
Marx, as Berman plots a historical progression wherein the ironic energies
of modernism as an aestheticized mode stage a rejoinder to the “bad,” lethal
contradictions of modernization. Along with his memorable image of a
countercultural “modernism” in the streets, Berman lionizes Baudelaire as
the paragon of such a mindset. Yet irrespective of its progenitors, that
mindset can ultimately be boiled down to style. As Berman concedes of the
“New Left” whose “project was shot through with paradox from the start,”
such an awareness “infused [a leftist politics] with a deep sense of irony, a
tragic irony that haunted all our spectacular productions of political
comedy.”84
This spirit of modernist comedy and ironic play has indeed left its mark
on critical legal scholarship, evident even within early incursions of critical
theory into the legal academy. Published within the same 1984 Stanford
Law Review Symposium on “Critical Legal Studies” as Bob Gordon’s
Critical Legal Histories is a staged debatebetween Kennedy and Peter
Gabel. That text, titled Roll Over Beethoven, epitomizes each and every one
of the above tendencies.85 Parroting a pseudo-Platonic dialogue or dialectic,
Kennedy and Gabel’s agenda is not only to theorize but also to dramatize
the consciousness-raising energies of effective social movements, conjuring
their experiential dynamics. And while informing the dialogue’s subject
matter, such an effort to pinpoint, rhetorically capture, and arouse the
charismatic workings of insurrectionary sociohistorical change also
animates its self-aestheticizing, subversive mode and ethos. In effect, Roll
Over Beethoven exhibits its own prioritization of form, genre, and
aesthetics as the starting point from which to imagine radical social
progress.
Kennedy and Gabel entertain a range of different rationales for that often
overt emphasis on style. Key moments within Roll Over Beethoven are
meta-theoretical. For instance, Kennedy and Gabel don a simultaneously
performative and ironic affect precisely in order to avoid what they describe
as “falling into the trap of conceptual knowledge and ‘rationalism,’” which
they further characterize as symptomatic of mainstream legal study.86
Related are the text’s experimental features, which Kennedy and Gabel
similarly justify as necessary to avoid ideological cooptation. They
outwardly defend the need “to undercut [theory] the minute that it becomes
frozen in the same way that rights discourse becomes frozen.”87 Unlike
normative constructs like rights or “philosophical”, “conceptualist” patterns
of thought, the protean, slippery workings of a reflexive dialogue are
84. Id. at 328.
85. Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 3.
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celebrated as defiant of being “taken over and falsified to legitimate
oppression.”88
The parodic joke is another rhetorical gesture put forward as structurally
immune to liberal-legal cooptation. In many respects, the dialogue itself
instantiates the “jokey, colloquial things” that Gabel and Kennedy exalt,
although they are also deliberate in spelling out the qualities that inoculate
jokes against opportunistic pillaging. As Gabel explains, “[t]hey can’t take
over a joke, which has its momentary unveiling that can’t be captured by
the other side. Whereas any philosophical discussion can be captured.”89 As
Kennedy later puts it, “we can defend the integrity of our own
communication, the reality of our community better with jokes than we will
ever be able to defend its integrity with a more abstract formulation.”90
Indeed, effective jokes are contagious, breeding catching laughter that begs
to be prolonged and repeated. Clever jokes summon their own retelling, and
the more infectious their irony—and more delicious their feats of
unveiling—the more automatically will such humor self-propagate.
In this vein, Kennedy and Gabel’s epigraph, taken from Chuck Berry’s
song by that title, alludes to another vector of contagion: “I got the rockin
pneumonia / Need a shot of rhythm and blues.”91 Also infectious, we know,
is aesthetic experience. It is tempting to attribute these “yearnings” for an
aestheticized theory to left legal scholarship’s enclosure within a sterile
professionalized setting. Yet popular music and especially rock-and-roll
simultaneously furnish the dialogue’s titular motif for the aspirational
consciousness-raising undertaken by critical and revisionist thought, along
with the imperative to critique. Berry’s original title is clearly a plea to
capsize the stodgy, rule-bound constraints of classical music à la Beethoven,
“rolling over” tradition and its authority. While pointing to those roots of
rock-and-roll, Kennedy and Gabel’s emblem of “having music at the
meeting” further underscores the phenomenological, charged, lived,
rhythmic modes of engagement that the dialogue itself strives to activate.
Indeed, Berry’s music inaugurated an unprecedented cult of the popular,
allaying another common fear of the academic left: a fear of losing touch
with the very populace to which theory purports to lend expression.92
In the end, Kennedy and Gabel’s vision of an aestheticized politics is not
so distant from Rorty’s or Berman’s pleas, in particular given their shared
hopes that a poetics will both collectivize and politically awaken. To be
sure, there are and were many salutary reasons for extolling such
charisma—whether as an attempt to preserve the electricity of the late 1960s
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id. at 11-13.
90. Id. at 11.
91. CHUCK BERRY, Roll Over Beethoven, on CHUCK BERRY IS ON TOP (Chess Records 1956).
92. Hence, one might read here a yearning to forge the Gramscian “organic intellectual.”
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or to evade the snares of liberal rationalism. However, it is hard to escape
the conversions implicit to this common reasoning that this essay has
examined. What begins as a diagnosis and critique (whether of modernity
or of law) is fast transmuted into a redemptive cure. The very properties
deployed to indict and to unmask the ideological mystifications of not only
power but also mainstream legal, historical, and other scholarship are
almost automatically transformed into an antidote to those same errors.
Something about the logic of paradox, ambivalence, contradiction,
indeterminacy, and those term’s many counterparts can seem to alchemize
these multitudinous functions.
This critical arsenal that I’ve described as the paradox matrix also
demands historicization—from numerous perspectives. It is hard to dispute
that this conceptual architecture has not become a methodological status
quo, possessing an often compulsory orthodoxy that, in extreme form, can
supervise the borders of what counts as “critical” “theory.” But despite
being brandished as both radical and dissident, that repertoire of stock
moves has become not only predictable but also mechanistic. Even when
espousing a poetic relish for contingency and play, such thinking has
elicited highly formulaic applications. Beyond representing a foregone
conclusion, the discovery of qualities like contradiction and paradox has
become programmatic, circumscribing the kinds of recognitions
madeavailable.
Another concern involves the dominant guises of power in the twenty-
first century. One abiding premise of theory has been that power, ideology,
and domination detest paradox and contradiction. It has been axiomatic that
oppression camouflages itself with a façade of unity and coherence, shoring
itself up by not only monopolizing meaning, truth, and authority but also
suppressing pluralistic alterity and difference. Only within such a
conceptual landscape does it make sense to endow the paradox matrix with
such potent force and exorbitant hopes. Only if power cannot tolerate
contradiction will faculties like irony, indeterminacy, and contingency be
heralded as inherently subversive and political. Such modes of thought thus
have depended on—and reinforced—a highly specific yet narrow and
outmoded understanding of power and its anatomy.
Because, does power today really look the same as it did during the Cold
War era that consolidated theory? Are domination and ideology always and
invariably secured by masking structural contradiction, and does power in
the twenty-first century really barricade itself by totalizing truth and
meaning? Or to the contrary, is it more accurate to say that power today
cultivates and exploits a vertiginous sea of half-truths and bottomless
contradictions? One need not look far for evidence that contemporary
displays of authoritarianism indeed encourage utter disregard for
objectivizable truth, normative content, procedural integrity, and other such
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liberal-rationalist-legalistic indicia. Rather than threatened by
contradiction, power capitalizes on it, marshalling flagrant indeterminacy
as a diversionary mechanism and ideological armor. Instead of
opportunistically colonizing the rule of law, oppression can seem to delight
in the transgression of all proceduralist protocols and safeguards. In our
worst nightmares, it can thus seem like power has learned to commandeer
the most trusted resources of the left, leveraging paradox and contradiction
indeed to create a normative-ethical vacuum.
Perhaps, then, an eventuality that a thinker like Rorty found
incomprehensible—that civic discourse would succumb to a public culture
of ironism—has taken hold, becoming the prevailing face of contemporary
politics.93 Yet regardless of how we denominate these developments, it
seems increasingly clear that theory’s usual war chest is ill-equipped to
confront the greatest threats of the present. When power cloaks itself in
paradox, it is hard to imagine that throwing still more paradox into the mix
will counteract such a syndrome. Similarly, when public reason becomes a
morass of indeterminacy, unearthing even more indeterminacy will neither
dissipate that haze of untruth nor fill the resulting abyss. And when the
“joke” becomes a smokescreen utilized to obscure power’s abuses, it is not
so clear that parody will in-and-of-itself provide a necessary counterweight
capable of resetting civic discourse and its ethical-political compass.
Rather, the very bywords and styles of critique that we have investigated
can seem prone to compound the problem.
This essay has argued that a worship of paradox, contradiction,
indeterminacy, antagonism, and a matrix of such qualities has unified the
theory canon, harmonizing otherwise discordant schools of thought. This in
part because those intellectual tools have not only been enlisted to diagnose
and to critique but also been celebrated as the recipe for a transformative
politics. The manifold functions fulfilled by that web of critical terms surely
make it understandable that so many diverse thinkers would gravitate
toward such reasoning. But this essay has foremost sought to raise a number
of worries about that methodological privileging of paradox and
contradiction, among others asking about the colonialist underpinnings of
such a conceptual architecture. Yet perhaps most alarming is not how such
thought can seem rote and predictable. Rather, dedication to such styles of
theory can increasingly serve—with great irony—to neuter real difficulty,
sterilizing real dilemmas that cannot be thus digested.
93. See RORTY, supra note 72, at 87.
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